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UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS AS
NEW (AND PEACEFUL)AMERICAN
REVOLUTIONARIES
DANIEL I. MORALES∗
This essay situates undocumented migrants in the history of the
American revolutionary period. The lawbreaking of both groups
produced constructive legal and social change. For example, the masses
of American revolutionaries and many of their leading men fought to rid
the colonies of hereditary aristocracy. Colonists had come to cherish the
proto-meritocracy that had bloomed on colonial shores and rankled at
local evidence of aristocratic privilege, like the Crown’s grant of landed
estates to absentee English aristocrats.
Today’s equivalent hereditary aristocracy is the citizenry of wealthy
democracies like the United States. Hereditary citizens use immigration
restrictions to reserve the wealth and privilege of rich-world citizenship
for themselves and invited guests. The undocumented peacefully
challenge this status quo by migrating and remaining in the United States
without permission, securing citizenship for their American-born
children, and protesting that “no one is illegal.” In these ways the
undocumented seize some of the aristocratic privileges of American
citizenship and fight for others. For this and other reasons, the
undocumented are contemporary heirs to the revolutionary moment—
the true tea partiers of the twenty-first century.
INTRODUCTION
Good things can come from illegal acts—like the founding of the
oldest extant constitutional democracy. Knowing this, the United States
tolerates a level of disorder and illegality that our technologies of
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governance could eradicate, if we loosed them.1 Our tradition condones
and sometimes validates law-breaking in exchange for the promise that
our legal regime can obtain a degree of legitimacy which strict
adherence to and enforcement of the positive law cannot provide.2 This
tradition of constructive illegality draws on colonial and English
antecedents, but took a recognizably American shape in the
Revolutionary period. In this essay I trace the contours of constructive
illegality in the revolutionary period and locate the actions and
advocacy of undocumented immigrants in that tradition.3
By drawing analogies to some of the prominent reasons why
American revolutionaries took up arms—like, eliminating hereditary
aristocracy and reformulating the relationship between sovereign and
subject—I argue that undocumented people are modern, non-violent,
American revolutionaries, helping to test concepts of legitimate state
authority and global social justice. “Illegal” migration is consistent with
our legal tradition, not opposed to it.
The great, or at least most obvious normative tensions, embedded
1. See generally Daniel Ibsen Morales, In Democracy’s Shadow: Fences, Raids and the
Production of Migrant Illegality, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L 23 (2009) (discussing how a lack of
administrative state autonomy creates inefficiencies and distortions in immigration enforcement
strategy).
2. See, e.g., David C. Williams, The Constitutional Right to “Conservative” Revolution, 32
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 429–32 (1997) (describing how the actions of American
revolutionaries were both “ultra vires”—illegal—and arguably constitutional). A contemporary
example of constructive illegality is the often illegal actions of Silicon Valley startups like Uber,
Lyft, and AirBNB. Breaking laws to change them is an explicit part of their business strategies.
Arguably, American localities relative tolerance for this approach, allows for a more efficient and
informed negotiation between the localities and these new services. The concrete evidence of the
benefits of these services for users creates a constituency that can negotiate its interests against
the established interests of pre-existing stakeholders, like cab owners and hotels. Had these
startups first asked for permission, they would likely not have been able to make headway against
the interests of established stakeholders.
3. I am not writing a history, at least not one that makes a historical claim to be the “best”
account of what happened in the past, or that corrects one or another historiographical error. My
purpose is to place undocumented migration in conversation with a lauded historical instance of
mass lawbreaking to illustrate how the law-breaking of the undocumented might be similarly
viewed as a constructive part of our legal and political tradition. See also Victor C. Romero, Our
Illegal Founders, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 147 (2013) (analogizing illegal border drawing
practices and broken treaties with Native Americans to the trespasses of the undocumented). By
making this specific historical analogy, I also aim to push against the tendency to locate the legal
possibility of unconstrained peaceful migration in the domain of international human rights. This
local approach to building cosmopolitan infrastructure emerges from my prior work. I have
argued elsewhere that building the cosmopolitan ethic that will be required to significantly
liberalize migration will necessarily be a very local endeavor. See Daniel I. Morales, Immigration
Reform and the Democratic Will, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 49, 87–93 (2013) (describing how
attention to creating institutions that can persuade individual citizens to let go of their fears of
migrants is a predicate to further liberalization of migration).
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in our constitutional tradition at the outset have been resolved. People
of African descent, once slaves, are citizens, not property; women are
voters and workers, not means of propagating the body politic; gay men
and women can love openly and have their relationships validated by
the state on the same terms as heterosexuals; the New Deal and the
Great Society lent more substance to the formal equality the
Constitution always guaranteed and that various civil rights
movements have realized.4
The starkest remaining contradiction in the United States and other
wealthy democracies is between alien and citizen, outsider and insider.
Unlike nearly all other laws in such democracies, the laws that enforce
this distinction between citizen and “alien” are made without any
formal input from the aliens who must follow them.5 The movement of
the undocumented into the U.S. and their rights advocacy on behalf of
themselves and other noncitizens are exposing and helping to
overcome peaceful noncitizens’ unjust and undemocratic exclusion
from our borders.6
I. THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF CONSTRUCTIVE ILLEGALITY
The American revolutionaries were lawbreakers; they committed a
series of treasonous legal breaches backed by force.7 There were violent
precursors too. Colonists expressed their objection to the Stamp Act of
1765—a statute duly enacted by Parliament—by rioting (it worked,
Parliament repealed the act).8 Colonists damaged valuable private

4. This is not to diminish the contemporary legacy of these tensions in people’s lived
experiences, or the way we have backslid or stalled on racial and economic justice, for instance.
The point is rather to emphasize the progress, formal and substantive, that has been made, and
what those shifts owe to law-breaking and our tolerance for it. From there, we can come to see
how illegal migration might be similarly constructive and similar grounded in our traditions of
legal and political contestation.
5. See Arash Abizadeh, Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally
Control Your Own Borders, 36 POL. THEORY 37, 38 (2008) (arguing that democratic states must
democratically justify border control laws to noncitizens as well as citizens).
6. For an extended defense of the constructive quality of undocumented migrants, see
Daniel I. Morales, “Illegal” Migration is Speech, IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2017), draft available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2656567 [hereinafter Illegal Migration].
7. See Robert M. S. McDonald, Thomas Jefferson’s Changing Reputation as Author of the
Declaration of Independence: The First Fifty Years, 19 J. OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 169 (1999)
(calling the Declaration of Independence “treasonous”); see also Williams, supra note 2, at 443
(listing the potential moments where the actions of the American revolutionaries became illegal).
8. GARY B. NASH, THE UNKNOWN AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE UNRULY BIRTH OF
DEMOCRACY AND THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE AMERICA 46–48 (Penguin Books 2005)
(describing the riots over the Stamp Act).
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property to protest the Tea Act of 1773.9 In the aftermath, when the
Crown tried to impose order through the imposition of legally
authorized force, it faced locally organized militias.10 From there, the
tide of revolution began to crest. The Declaration, then the Articles, the
Constitution (in violation of the Articles),11 and the Bill of Rights: the
first government to declare itself to rule by virtue of the People’s
blessing—not God’s, or the King’s.12
The Revolutionary War was both illegal13 and constructive: out of
the illegal break with England came the first government to try and
make certain enlightenment values real.14
The revolution’s constructive illegality had precedents in prerevolutionary colonial practices: riots were viewed, for instance, as a
way for common men to register their dissatisfaction with laws, rulers,
or policies. The illegality of revolution was justified as a means to
protect important achievements in social justice—like the elimination
of hereditary aristocracy, and as a way of countering the injustice of the
unchecked and unlimited power of the crown in the colonies. The
revolution was also motivated by a conviction that idealistic theories—
like a government by, for and of the people—could be implemented in
the real world.
9. See JOHN W. SHY, TOWARD LEXINGTON: THE ROLE OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN THE
COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 401 (Princeton Univ. Press 1965); id. at 90 (noting that
in the Boston Tea Party protestors destroyed £10,000 worth of tea).
10. LYNN HUNT, THOMAS R. MARTIN, BARBARA H. ROSENWEIN, R. PO-CHIA HSIA,
BONNIE G. SMITH, THE MAKING OF THE WEST: PEOPLES AND CULTURES: 1320–1830 718 (2001).
11. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453
(1989) (“Almost all modern lawyers recognize that, in proposing a new Constitution in the name
of We the People, the Philadelphia Convention was acting illegally under the terms established
by America’s first formal constitution-the Articles of Confederation solemnly ratified by all
thirteen states only a few years before.”).
12. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 189
(Vintage Press 1992) (noting the sovereign power of the people under the U.S. Constitution); id.
at 719 (“The Constitution’s preamble insisted explicitly, for the first time in history, that
government derived its power solely from the people and did not depend on divine right or
aristocracy.”).
13. The Colonists understood their break with England as justified and legal because their
treatment by parliament and the Crown was inconsistent with English constitutional principles.
The English obviously had a different view on the legality of the colonists’ actions. See Williams,
supra note 2, at 442–43. The relationship between the undocumented and the United States can
be characterized in a similar way. Undocumented people have plainly broken laws, but as Political
theorist Arash Abizadeh has argued such laws are null, since aliens have no vote or voice in the
formation of these laws, which makes existing border laws fundamentally inconsistent with
democracy. See generally Abizadeh, supra note 5. Which label sticks, in both cases, is ultimately
a function of who has the practical power to enforce its view of what the law is.
14. But see Juan Perea, Race and Constitutional Law Casebooks: Recognizing the Proslavery
Constitution, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1123 (2012).

MORALES (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

10/10/2016 5:42 PM

THE UNDOCUMENTED AS REVOLUTIONARIES

139

All these aspects of constructive illegality, I show below, can be
analogized to undocumented migration. By drawing the comparison, I
hope to complicate and problematize the characterization of the
undocumented as simply “illegal” in a novel way, and to ground
undocumented migration and our relative tolerance for the
undocumented in an American historical tradition.
A. Constructive Illegality and the Voice of the Disenfranchised
Prior to the American Revolution, resistance—burning effigies,
vandalism, threatening violence15—to the deployment of official power
was viewed as a natural and constructive part of colonial life. “[I]n
certain circumstances, it was understood, the people would rise up
almost as a natural force, much as night follows day, and this
phenomenon often contributed to the public welfare.”16 Where
grievances had festered, and officials remained unresponsive or
obstinate, there was “a readiness among many Americans to act outside
the bounds of law.” But threats and violence were usually a last resort,
or a response to the systematic foreclosure of peaceable means to
redress grievances.17 The latter rationale supported tenant-farmer
protests in New York’s Hudson River Valley, illustrating the way that
tacitly-approved law-breaking was negotiated in the colonial period.
[The valley] had long been controlled by a few wealthy families with
enormous landholdings, which were so large that they rivaled the
manors of English nobility. Rensselaerswyck Manor totaled [one]
million acres, Philipse Manor 200,000 acres . . . [b]y 1710 every acre
of some eight hundred square miles of Dutchess County had been
patented to a handful of absentee landlords . . . Most of these vast
tracts were acquired as virtually free gifts from royal governors, and
some were obtained by outright fraud.18

Vast landed wealth secured political control of similar scope. “The
landlords dominated local government, including, most importantly,
control of the courts.”19 And, by the mid-eighteenth century, the same
group of “local oligarchs . . . had a powerful grip on the colony’s
legislature. Facing such odds, the grievances of tenants against their

15. See, e.g., NASH, supra note 8, at 44–55.
16. PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION: COLONIAL RADICALS AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO BRITAIN, 1765-1776 3 (W.W. Norton & Co.
1973).
17. Id. at 11.
18. NASH, supra note 8, at 79.
19. Id. at 80.
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landlords had only one realistic channel—going outside the law.”20 And
so they did. “[W]hen the manager of Philipse Manor demanded in 1765
that tenant farmers surrender their long-term leases for new one- to
three-year leases[,]”21 tenant farmer William Prendergast vowed to
“relieve the oppressed” and led “angry tenants” “on a rampage to
reclaim the farms from which they had been evicted.”22 In response the
“New York Attorney General issued a bench warrant for the arrest of
the tenant rioters.”23 This escalated things. “An even greater number of
tenant farmers . . . agreed unanimously to march on [New York City] to
‘do justice and relieve the oppressed’”24 and perhaps “pull down”—i.e.,
destroy—the city mansions of the landlords.25
But it wasn’t to be. The farmers were met by the local British
regiment and retreated. The Governor “ordered Prendergast’s
arrest.”26 A New York City Alderman was dispatched to arrest him, but
the alderman (or his constituents) sympathized enough with the
Farmers’ plight that he dawdled for a bit to give Prendergast time to
escape.27 Three months later, a British regiment caught up with
Prendergast in Poughkeepsie28 and “hauled” him off to Dutchess
County where he was charged with high treason. A jury of landlords
tried him in a special court in New York City; Prendergast defended
himself, testifying that “he accepted the leadership role [in the uprising]
because ‘it was hard’ . . . that poor people ‘were not allowed to have any
property’ and were driven from the land where the sweat of their brows
had made the land flourish . . . ‘there was no law for poor men’ . . . In
such a skewed legal system, going outside the law was justifiable.”29 A
small farmer and witness for the landlords at trial testified “that evicted
tenants believed they were entitled to defy the law because”30 their
“equitable title . . . could not be defended in a court of law because they
were poor and . . . poor men were always oppressed by the rich.”31
The interests of the landlords adjudging the case predictably
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id. at 84.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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dictated the guilty verdict, but the sentence rankled the masses:
Prendergast “shall be hanged by the neck . . . cut down alive, and his
entrails and privy members shall be cut from his body and shall be
burned in his sight, and his head shall be cut off, and his body shall be
divied into four parts and shall be disposed of at the kings pleasure.”32
The point, of course, was to send a message to the rabble, but none of
the rabble could be persuaded to help execute the sentence. And so,
growing aware of “widespread sympathy for Prendergast, [the]
Governor reprieved him” and the King, who had the final say, relented
too.33
While the tenant-farmers did not achieve the redress they sought,
their protest was not for nothing either. In the oligarchical political
system the tenant-farmers faced, their uprising was the best means
available to convey their political position to those in power and
renegotiate the social order. Absent such shows of plebian power, the
needs of common men had few ways to enter34 into the calculus of
political decision, few ways of being heard at all.35 In that context, then,
the law-breaking of the tenant farmers was an “‘evil . . . productive of
good”36: they clearly brought popular feelings . . . to bear on public
authority; and, as Thomas Jefferson argued most cogently in 1787, they
tended to hold rulers ‘to the true principles of their institutions’ and so
provide ‘a medicine necessary for the sound health of government.’”37
This kind of principled law-breaking also steeled the masses called
forth to fight in the Revolutionary War.

32. Id.
33. Id. at 87.
34. See Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the
Right to Petition, 66 FORD. L. REV. 2153 (1998) (describing mechanisms, like petitions, which
disenfranchised citizens used to seek redress of grievances by political actors).
35. From a modern perspective we might be inclined to see this entire dispute through the
private law lens. But, as Gordon Wood has pointed out the public/private distinction is not only
anachronistic, the desire to create such a distinction was anti-monarchical and a motivating reason
for the Revolutionary War. See WOOD, supra note 12, at 252. The dichotomy between public and
private simply did not exist under pre-revolutionary colonial rule.
36. See MAIER, supra note 16, at 24 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Jan. 30, 1787) in 11 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON JANUARY 1–AUGUST 6, 1787
93 (Julian Boyd ed.) (1955)).
37. Id.
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The practice and tacit-approval of law-breaking for the good of the
body politic was not isolated to the colonies, but imported from
England where the norm was so deeply rooted that its constitutional
status could be entertained. “Thus, members of the British House of
Lords could seriously argue that ‘rioting is an essential part of our
constitution’” and that “[m]obs, a sort of them at least, are
constitutional.”38 Indeed, popular uprisings were “symptoms of a
strong and healthy Constitution.”39 One could not expect the people to
manifest “that pacific, timid, obsequious, and servile temper, so
predominant in more despotic governments.”40 If this was true of the
English it was all the more true in the American colonies, if only
because the freedom white American colonists enjoyed was
extraordinary. “[T]he [white] colonists knew they were freer, more
equal, more prosperous, and less burdened with cumbersome feudal
and monarchical restraints than any other part of mankind in the
eighteenth century.”41 If freedom generally tended to produce a spirit
primed to contest authority, then the United States had more of that
esprit than any other place.
1. The Undocumented Are Protesting the Global Social Order
The undocumented occupy a political and social position similar to
that of the tenant farmers of the revolutionary period. Though they
labor in service of employers, and increase U.S. G.D.P., the
undocumented are disempowered in a number of ways.
Not only do noncitizens lack a formal say in the U.S. legal and policy
debates that affect them, the undocumented are also disempowered in
their countries of origin. They lack the power to force the governments
in their native lands to negotiate successfully with the United States to
loosen immigration restriction and to improve the living conditions of
the undocumented.42 The governments of the undocumented’s home
countries often have their own immigration sovereignty concerns that
they wish to protect. Their primary concern is not their citizens, but the
flow of remittances to the families of the undocumented that remain in

38. Id.
39. Id. at 23.
40. Id. (quoting Josiah Quincy Junior in 1770).
41. WOOD, supra note 12, at 4.
42. Once inside the United States, laboring and living, the undocumented can contest the
disabilities of their status as “illegal.” See generally Morales, Illegal Migration, supra note 6.
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their poor countries of birth. The remittance money makes foreign
governments more accommodating to U.S. immigration preferences,
rather than antagonistic.
These conditions of radical disenfranchisement parallel the
disenfranchisement of the tenant farmers, and similarly justify the
actions of the undocumented. Prendergast insisted that going outside
the law was justifiable where the legal system failed to protect the
interests of the poor tenant farmers. The undocumented insist that “no
one is illegal”43 for similar reasons. Moreover, just as the tenant farmers
believed that their continuous toil on their tenancies granted them
equitable title to the land they worked, so too do the undocumented
argue that their labor entitles them to equitable rights to remain in the
U.S.,44 to the “property” of citizenship.
In the manner of revolution-era riots, undocumented migration
facilitates consideration of noncitizens’ interests in the political
calculus. Sitting at home, pining for a life in the United States, the
undocumented cannot force or persuade the U.S. to change its visa
policies and admit them. But when the undocumented break the law
and enter the U.S., they not only seize the privileges of rich-world life
that the U.S. chose to deny them, they also send a clear message that
the American immigration system and the broader political order of
which it is a part, do not meet their needs. As a result, the global powers
that be must take note and adjust to the eleven million undocumented
who contest their exclusion by remaining in the United States, even if
only by paying to have the undocumented deported.
Finally, explicit political protests by the undocumented, like the day
without an immigrant, recalls the defiance of the tenant farmers in the
face of the manor lords’ issuance of a death sentence. Both protests
sought to convey the message that their respective societies depend on
the labor and cooperation of the disenfranchised—and, in doing so,
showcased the power that these groups can wield.45
43. “No One is Illegal” is a movement “[i]nitiated in Montreal in the early 2000s [and] . . .
spread to other major cities and began engaging in aggressive campaigns against deportations.”
CHRIS DIXON, ANOTHER POLITICS: TALKING ACROSS TODAY’S TRANSFORMATIVE
MOVEMENTS 49 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2014).
44. See Ayelet Shachar, Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration Reform, 23
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 110, 135 (2011) (arguing that property law provides analogies relevant to
the right of undocumented people to remain in the United States).
45. See generally JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF
PEASANT RESISTANCE 29–31 (Yale Univ. Press 1987) (theorizing strategies like “foot dragging,
dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, [and] sabotage” as
“weapons of the weak”: the means by which oppressed people resist power, as well as cultivate
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B. Violence (or Law-Breaking) for Liberation
The revolutionaries broke their fealty to the British Crown—
committed treason—for a purpose that liberated individuals from the
social limits of hereditary aristocracy. As Gordon Wood has argued
(contra the received view that the American revolution was the most
conservative in history) the revolution was not just a legal and political
transformation, but a legal-political transformation in service of radical
social change. “[I]f we measure [revolutionary] radicalism by the
amount of social change that actually took place—by transformations
in the relationships that bound people to each other—then the
American Revolution was not conservative at all; on the contrary: it
was as radical and as revolutionary as any in history.”46 It is hard for us
to recognize the reorientation because it was “radical . . . in a very
special eighteenth-century sense.”47
The social distinctions and economic deprivations that we today
think of as the consequence of class divisions, business exploitation,
or various isms . . . were in the eighteenth century usually thought to
be caused by abuses of government. Social honors, social
distinctions, perquisites of office, business contacts privileges and
monopolies, even excessive property and wealth of various sorts—
in fact seemed to flow from connections to government, in the end
from connections to monarchical authority.48

The central radical achievement of the Revolution was that it
“destroyed aristocracy as it had been understood in the Western world
for at least two millennia.”49 That evisceration of feudal privilege and
the flattening of the minutely-tiered hierarchy that regulated
entitlements to those privileges “brought respectability and even
dominance to ordinary people long held in contempt and gave dignity
to their menial labor in a manner unprecedented in history.”50
In Wood’s telling, the colonial mind was as formed by monarchy as
those of Englishman living at the seat of empire; every colonial social
stratum shared the co-dependent world-view of their English peers. But
the peculiar social and economic opportunities of the colonies, coupled
with the relatively thin aristocratic presence in the New World created

and maintain an oppositional consciousness).
46. WOOD, supra note 12, at 5.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 8.
50. Id. at 8.

MORALES (DO NOT DELETE)

10/10/2016 5:42 PM

THE UNDOCUMENTED AS REVOLUTIONARIES

2016]

145

conditions that made aristocratic privilege and the political structure
that reinforced it began to seem “less natural, less ordained by God,
and more man-made, more arbitrary.”51
In the early colonial period the colonists did their best to replicate
the old-world:
[They] may not have known much of real kings and courts, but they
knew very well the social hierarchy that the subjection and
subordination of monarchy necessarily implied. Monarchy
presumed what Hume called “a long train of dependence,” a
gradation of degrees of freedom and servility that linked everyone
from the king at the top down to the bonded laborers and black
slaves at the bottom . . . In this traditional world “every Person has
his proper Sphere and is of Importance to the whole.” Ideally in
such a hierarchy no one was really independent, no one was every
alone and unattached.52

Everyone had his place. This static order was reinforced
geographically as well. Using “warning-out” laws, New England towns
“could legally eject ‘strangers’ and have constables convey them from
town to town until they were returned to the town where they legally
belonged.53 Yet this ancient order, incrementally and through a
confluence of forces, came undone, so that by the “1760s and 1770s . . .
the absence of a traditional European nobility and a sprawling mass of
the destitute made everyone [in the colonies] seem much more alike.”54
An important part of this phenomenon was the changed social
meaning of labor. Labor was traditionally demeaning in aristocratic
society, “the consequence of necessity and poverty,”55 but in the
colonies it came to be seen as an important social leveler. Even in South
Carolina, the most aristocratic of the colonies, “the distinction between
the farmer and a rich planter, the mechanic and the rich merchant” was
more “imagination, than reality.”56 The historical novelty of these
relatively equalized circumstances made the colonists feel that this new
social organization was very precarious and so whatever aristocratic
privilege remained seemed threatening out of all proportion to the
actual power the weak colonial gentry could wield.57
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 145.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 171.
Id.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 171.
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The point for our purposes is that the revolutionary effort was
motivated—at every level of society—in important part by the desire
to preserve and to deepen these radical social changes. This was not to
say that landed wealthy men did not worry about rule by plebeians. But
even these men, who touted a natural aristocracy of talent and merit,
rankled at unmerited, hereditary aristocratic privilege.58
1. Undocumented Migration Seizes the Unjust Privileges of the
Aristocracy of Citizens
If hereditary aristocracy was the social bugbear of the late
eighteenth century in America and France, unilateral control of
movement across borders—based on hereditary concepts of
citizenship59—is the twenty-first century analogue. There is a globalized
“free trade” economic order that throws capital and goods hither and
thither across the globe, but radically restricts the movement of persons
across borders, particularly from poor countries to rich ones with
higher productivity levels.60 Access to the privileges of wealth and the
productive use and development of one’s labor are granted based on
the arbitrary accident of birth.61 Just as the colonists committed treason
to liberate themselves from an aristocratic social order, so do the
undocumented—without violence—effectively demand a liberating
order that abolishes the hereditary hoarding of citizenship and its
privileges for citizens and their invited guests.
Labor plays an important role in upending the citizen aristocracy,
just as it did in the revolutionary era. While factions of the citizenry
attempt to portray migrant labor as a species of theft, the older,
58. Id. at 180.
59. See generally JACQUELINE STEVENS, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS: CITIZENSHIP FOR
MORTALS (Colum. Univ. Press 2009).
60. The difference in living standards between countries is an order of magnitude greater
than the differences within the countries of the developed world. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Ways
to Help, N.Y. TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (Nov. 18 2015), http://www.thetls.co.uk/articles/private/ways-to-help/ (“In real purchasing power – not just money – someone
living below the US poverty level, earning $11,000 a year, is in the top 15 per cent of the world
income distribution. Someone earning $28,000 a year, the median individual income in the US, is
in the top 5 per cent. Someone earning $52,000 or more is in the top 1 per cent. The bottom 20
per cent of the world’s population earns less than $550 a year in US purchasing power, and lives
at an almost unimaginable level of want.”).
61. Moving a poor person from a low-productivity to a high productivity state is the easiest
way to engage in economic development. See generally LANT PRITCHETT, LET THEIR PEOPLE
COME: BREAKING THE GRIDLOCK ON GLOBAL LABOR MOBILITY 33 (Ctr. for Global Dev.
2006). Productivity is in the air—a public good—in high productivity states, and immigrants’
access to that productive “air” generates returns that are orders of magnitude higher than even
the most effective economic development strategies. Id.
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ennobling tradition of labor—birthed in the pre-revolutionary era—
continues to have a hold on the public as well. The way in which hard
work continues to signal membership in the natural American
aristocracy of merit has helped the undocumented ground their claims
for membership.62
C. Giving “The People” Power by Making Utopian Theories Real
The American revolutionaries had a utopian streak; they tried to
make a pie-in-the-sky theory real. The Revolution and its aftermath
radically reconfigured political sovereignty by locating it outside of any
political institution and placing it in “the People,”63 the collective of
individuals residing in the colonies. This notion that the collection of
individuals to be governed are sovereign came out of “Real Whig”
political theory, which, inter alia, granted the people themselves the
power to engage in a full-scale “revolution, which denied the continued
legitimacy of the established government as a whole.”64
Significantly, this theory had become for the English a strictly
academic pursuit by the late eighteenth century. Prominent
Englishmen came to believe that a sovereign people was a practical
impossibility. William Blackstone, for example, characterized John
Locke’s assertion that ‘there remains . . . inherent in the people supreme
power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find the legislative
act contrary to the trust reposed in them” as just “theory.”65 “[W]e
cannot adopt it, nor argue from it, under any dispensation or
government at present actually existing.”66 “For Blackstone . . .
Parliament had, in effect, replaced the people as the repository of
sovereignty.”67
The colonists rejected this cramped English view of political
possibility, seeing no reason why idealistic theory could not become
real:
English efforts to distinguish political theory from practice were
questioned in America, most notably on the part of some who rose

62. For a thoughtful discussion of earned membership as the normative foundation for
legalization debates, see Ayelet Shachar, Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration
Reform, 23 YALE J. L. & HUM. 110 (2011).
63. See David C. Williams, Civic Constitutionalism, the Second Amendment, and the Right
of Revolution, 79 IND. L.J. 379, 380–81 (2004).
64. MAIER, supra note 16, at 28.
65. Id. at 46.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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to prominence in America’s revolutionary movement . . . . When
Josiah Quincy, Jr. Came across Blackstone’s statement, he asked in
the margin ‘whether a conclusion can be just in theory, that will not
bear adoption in practice.’ John Adams too was dumfounded when
he encountered an assertion that ‘revolution principles’ were ‘noble
and True’ but ‘the application of them to particular cases is wild and
utopian.’ ‘How they can be in general true, and not applicable to
particular cases, I cannot comprehend.’68

And this American variant of “Real Whig”69 political theory
traveled up and down the colonial seaboard, informing discussions
esoteric and plebian, “provid[ing] a strong unifying element”70 for the
diverse colonial people.
Thus, the belief that the noble and true should be made real—even
if deeply impractical—bound colonists together to fight for
independence. Our tradition of constructive illegality, then,
contemplates throwing off the constraints of the practical and the
poverty of the possible, in pursuit of the true and the right.
1. “Illegal” Migration Helps to Realize Ideal Theory
Just as Real Whig political theory seemed hopelessly idealistic to
the English, Cosmopolitan political theory—which imagines a world of
unrestricted migration for those with peaceful intentions71—is often
viewed as unserious, impossible and utopian. Yet the actions of the
undocumented themselves, have helped to test the viability of such
theories in the United States.
Cosmopolitanism, in essence, calls for each individual migrant to
choose for herself which political community she wishes to belong to,
rather than be bound to her country of birth.72 By migrating without
permission, the undocumented are testing the viability of a
cosmopolitan form of political organization—where the state does not
directly control who (with peaceful intentions) resides within its
boundaries or even whose progeny becomes a part of the citizenry.73
While this challenge to territorial sovereignty has lead portions of the
68. Id. at 47.
69. Id. at 27.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 59.
72. For discussion, see Morales, Illegal Migration, supra note 6, at 83–85 (discussing
cosmopolitan political theory); see also STEVENS, supra note 59, at 28–37 (arguing that liberal
political theory requires free movement of persons and analogizing restrictions on movement to
slavery).
73. Id.
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citizenry to frame the undocumented as a dire threat to the viability of
the United States, another cohort has accepted that the legal violation
of the undocumented is not and should not be a barrier to their
inclusion as members or the inclusion of their progeny.74 This
acceptance of the undocumented reflects a cosmopolitan ethos, one
that is being nurtured and given legal force inside the boundaries of
sanctuary cities.
This achievement, convincing a cohort of the citizenry that
membership norms ought to be more elastic and less legalistic, is quite
significant, given the strength of mainstream commitments on the left
and the right to full national control over who is permitted to
immigrate.

D. Power Without Limit is Unlawful
The Real Whig political theory was also a legal theory grounded in
the English constitutional precedent of the Glorious Revolution. And
while the legal arguments for the constructive law-breaking of the
revolution were numerous and complex, their gravamen was the
unrestrained character of the power that the empire could deploy
against the colonists. The colonists were not represented in Parliament
and Parliament’s authority to legislate was theoretically infinite. This
infinite coercive power over the colonists went unchecked.
The central fear of the colonists75—and, indeed, all Englishmen—in
the eighteenth century was the exercise of power without limit. The
notion that legitimate power is exercised and recognized through
power’s conformance with legal limits “was older than the Magna
Carta.”76 “The colonists . . . complained that Parliament would be their
‘sovereign’ without giving them any check, any ‘participation in the
deliberation, or the will.’ leaving them only the obligation to obey what
was commanded. ‘The colonists [said] that this sovereign . . . is an

74. See Jeffrey M. Jones, 65% Favor Path to Citizenship for Illegal Immigrants, GALLUP
(Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/184577/favor-path-citizenship-illegal-immigrants.
aspx.
75. In his magisterial four volume treatise on the American revolution, legal historian John
Philip Reid insists on the centrality of the concept of arbitrariness to the eighteenth century
English and colonial legal mind. See JOHN PHILIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE, 136–37 (Univ. of Wis. Press. 1992).
76. See id. at 6.

MORALES (DO NOT DELETE)

150

10/10/2016 5:42 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 12:1

absolute sovereign, an arbitrary lord, and that their obedience and
subjection, without the interposition of their own free will, is . . .
absolute slavery.”77
Ben Franklin, for example, objected to Parliament’s emerging legal
supremacy by arguing “that such doctrine is incompatible with every
idea in a civil constitution; . . . for this supreme authority, having no rule
or law to direct its operations, or limit its power, must necessarily
become arbitrary and absolute.”78
During the run-up to the Revolution, the unchecked authority of
parliament on colonial government manifested itself in numerous ways
that helped to justify treason against the crown. For example, the
Townshend Acts, which taxed glass, paper, paints, and teas, grated not
just because it was a tax imposed on colonists in which they had had no
say, but also because the revenues were to be used to consolidate
parliament’s power in the colonies “by making local judicial and
executive officials dependent on the Crown for their salaries.”79
Tying the judiciary and the executive to the crown in this way
threatened to cut the colonial assemblies out of power, since the
assemblies would lack anyone on their payroll to execute or uphold
their commands. By taking these civil functionaries out of colonial
control Parliament was eliminating a check on power that the colonies
had previously enjoyed.80
This abiding fear of unchecked power is the strongest political
tradition to emerge from the revolutionary period since it profoundly
influenced the architecture of the Constitution. In turn, continued
constitutional practice over the centuries has ensured that fear of
unchecked governmental power remains a vibrant part of the
American political tradition.

77. Id. at 139 (citing JOHN LIND, REMARKS ON THE PRINCIPAL ACTS OF THE THIRTEENTH
PARLIAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN: VOL. I CONTAINING REMARKS ON THE ACTS RELATING TO
THE COLONIES WITH A PLAN OF RECONCILIATION (1775)).
78. Id. at 135.
79. See REID, supra note 75, at 286.
80. Id. at 287. The Townshend Act salary provision reflected the then emerging doctrine of
Parliamentary supremacy which “threatened to end colonial autonomy or to codify permanent
colonial legislative subordination”: “[B]y raising revenue for the support of the civil government
you destroy the utility of the Assemblies . . . . The men whose deliberations heretofore had an
influence on every matter relating to the liberty and happiness of themselves and their
constituents will now find their deliberations of no more consequence than those of constables . . .
. Their influence will hardly be permitted to extend so high, as the keeping of roads in repair, as
that business may more properly be executed by those who receive the public cash.” Id.
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1. The Undocumented Challenge the Power Without Limit of
Immigration Law
Noncitizens in the United States live under the yoke of unchecked
power every day. Immigration law is notoriously under-regulated by
constitutional checks on legislative and executive power. Moreover,
noncitizens cannot vote, and so enjoy no direct political voice in
crafting the rules which they are obligated to follow. The
undocumented are the most vulnerable to the immigration regime’s use
of unchecked power, given the way that their very presence in the
United States is framed as an affront to sovereignty—the backbone, or
so the citizenry is told, of social order and the foundation of democratic
possibility.81
Yet, the undocumented person standing at the border, staring down
the “crimmigration complex”82 that has sprung up at colossal expense
in an effort to prevent him from joining the U.S. political community,
has had no say—no voice or vote—in forming the immigration law that
she is supposed to comply with. The grossly undemocratic—utterly
unchecked—quality of the law that excludes the undocumented and
regulates the lives of noncitizens places then in a similarly antagonistic
position to legal authority as the colonists at the moment of revolution.
CONCLUSION
The revolutionary era was a period of radical political, social, and
legal ferment. Its aftermath established a new form of government that
spread throughout Europe and eventually the world.
Today we have reached a moment where there is a global consensus
that the democratic nation-state, an eighteenth century political
structure (complete with various important innovations) represents the
apogee of human political evolution. This has to be wrong. American
democracy, and the countries that have adopted and adapted it to their
governments, carried forward an even older view of territorial
sovereignty, one where the sovereign—now, the citizenry—have
unfettered authority to decide which peaceful persons come in and out
of their borders. The inadequacy of this system in our globalized world
is readily apparent.83 The rich democracies move from immigration

81. Other scholars have imagined alternatives to this. See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 59.
82. Mary Fan, The Crimmigration Complex, 92 N.C. L. REV. 75 (2014).
83. The wealth of the rich world is grotesque when seen through a global lens. See Nagel,
supra note 60.
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crisis to immigration crisis without appreciating that their model of
sovereignty is inadequate to the contemporary landscape: democracy
must evolve.
I hope that the historical comparisons drawn in this essay helped to
illustrate how this needed, peaceful—if disordered—evolution is both
desirable and possible, and how it is being furthered by undocumented
migrants. The status quo, as undocumented migration shows, is not
meeting the needs of the global community of human beings.

